Simon Gaus
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∴ Dissertation Project: The Nature of Irrationality
 The topic of my dissertation project are requirements of ‘structural’ or ‘internal’ rationality and the corresponding forms of internal irrationality. Paradigmatic examples are having logically inconsistent beliefs, having intentions that one knows to be incompatible, not taking the believed necessary means to one’s action or not intending to do what one believes one ought to do. My main question is what these different forms of internal irrationality have in common, i.e. what unifies internal irrationality. The thesis I explore is that they all involve transparently inconsistent belief-like representations of the world, and that being internally irrational just is representing the world in a transparently inconsistent way. The three major parts of the project are 1) a defense of the view that transparent belief-inconsistency is both necessary and sufficient for theoretical state irrationality, 2) comprehensive cognitivism about practical rationality, and 3) a reductive account of apparent examples of diachronic process irrationality in terms of synchronic state irrationality

∴ Publications
Being Realistic about Reflective Equilibrium‘ (Critical Notice), with H. Altehenger and A. L. Menges, Analysis 15, 3 (2015)
Folgt aus dem Unwert der Tierhaltung ein Verbot des Fleischkonsums‘, Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (2013)

∴ Conference Presentations

‘What Unifies Requirements of Rationality?’, Tübingen Masterclass with John Broome, 07/22/2016 —handout

‘Sensitivity and Necessity’, Meeting of the European Epistemology Network, 07/07/2016 —abstract, handout

‘Was ist mentale Inkonsistenz?’ (“What is mental inconsistency?”), GAP.9, Osnabrück, 09/17/2015 —handout

Active participation in one’s own moral enhancement: it’s either rare or wortheless, The Brains Blog Online Symposium on Focquaert & Schermer, “Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?”, 08/25/2015 —archived symposium)

‘Is Irrationality a Matter of Internal Conflict?’, 5th Humboldt-Princeton Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Berlin ,07/14/2015 —handout)

‘Ist Zufall fairer als Willkür?’ (‘Is random selection more fair than arbitrary decision-making?’), XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, 10/02/2014 —handout)

‘Is Random Selection Inherently Fair?’, 4th Humboldt-Princeton Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Berlin, 08/14/2014

„Street’s Darwinian Dilemma. Undermining genealogical information, moral realism etc.“, 3rd Humboldt-Princeton Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Berlin, 08/06/2013

‘What makes undermining information undermining?’, 2ndHumboldt-King’s College Graduate Workshop, London, 05/03/2013)